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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this appeal by
virtue of the provisions of Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(3)(i) in
that this appeal was taken from an order of the Fourth Judicial
District Court for Utah County over which the Utah Court of Appealsdoes not have original appellate jurisdiction.

The defendant/

appellee/cross-appellant is entitled to its appeal as a matter of
right by virtue of the order of the trial court entered herein on
April 30, 1990, pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The following issues are presented for review in this
appeal:
1.
temporary

life

Does a life insurance company effectively terminate
insurance

coverage

simply

by

rejection

of the

insurance application and notice to the applicant of that rejection
prior to his death, or must the insurer also return the initial
premium and provide written notice of rejection, even where the
applicant has received actual notice of the rejection and has no
expectation of coverage?
2.

Did the trial court err in determining that the

Stevensons did not receive adequate notice of the rejection of
LaMar Stevenson's application for life insurance?

1

3.

Did the trial court err in determining that the

amount of life insurance which became effective upon issuance of
the conditional receipt was $300,000?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issues 2 and 3 above present factual questions, while
issue 1 presents a purely legal question.

This court recently

articulated its settled standard of review for considering factual
and legal challenges to summary judgment in Ron Case Roofing and
Asphalt v. Blomquist, 773 P.2d 1382 (Utah 1989), stating:
A grant of summary judgment is appropriate only
when no genuine issues of material fact exist
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.
Utah R.Civ.P. 56(c); see,
e.g., Geneva Pipe Co. v. S & H Insurance Co.,
714 P.2d 648, 649 (Utah 1986). In determining
whether the trial court correctly found that
there was no genuine issue of material fact, we
view the facts and inferences to be drawn
therefrom in the light most favorable to the
losing party. E.G., id. at 649; Atlas Corp. v.
Clovis National Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah
1987); Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch. , 701 P.2d
795, 802 (Utah 1985). And in deciding whether
the trial court properly granted judgment as a
matter of law to the prevailing party, we give
no deference to the trial court's view of the
law; we review it for correctness. E.G., Atlas
Corp., 737 P. 2d at 229; Kimball v. Campbell,
699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985); see also Scharf
v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985).
Id. at 1385.

Under this standard of review, the court should give

no deference to the trial court's view of the law under Smith v.
Westland Life Insurance Company, 539 P.2d 433 (Cal. 1975), that
written notice and return of premium are necessary to the termination of a temporary contract of life insurance, but should review
2

the law, de novo for correctness.

On issues 2 and 3, concerning

the court's implicit determination that no material facts exist as
to the adequacy of the notice of rejection of the life insurance
application

and

as to the

amount

of coverage

created by the

conditional receipt, this court should view the facts and inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to First
Colony Life Insurance Company and reverse the summary judgment
unless it is clear that no genuine issues of material fact exist.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE

LaMar Stevenson was killed in an automobile accident on
October 16, 1986.
filed

this

others,

action

claiming,

The plaintiff and appellee, Maurine Stevenson,
against
among

First

other

Colony

Insurance

things, that

Company

a valid

and

temporary

contract of insurance existed at the time of her husband's death.
Defendant
Company

filed

and

a motion

appellant

First

for summary

Colony

judgment

Life

Insurance

arguing that the

temporary contract of insurance created by the conditional receipt
was terminated by First Colony's rejection of LaMar Stevenson's
insurance application and notification to Mr. Stevenson of that
rejection.

The plaintiff countered with a motion for summary

judgment arguing that the contract remained in force as a result of
the failure of defendant to give written notice of the rejection
and failure to return the premium prior to LaMar Stevenson's death.

3

Without oral argument, the trial court granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and denied First Colony's motion
for summary judgment, relying upon the authority of the California
Supreme Court case of Smith v. Westland Life Insurance Company, 539
P.2d

433

adequate

(Cal. 1975), and holding that "because there was not
notice

that plaintiff's

temporary

insurance

had

been

cancelled, and because the premium was not returned timely, the
contract was in full force and effect at the time of Mr Stevenson's
death."

R. 296-297. A copy of Judge Harding's Memorandum Decision

is attached hereto as Exhibit 1 to the Addendum.
and

oral

After objections^

argument over the amount of the coverage, the court

ultimately entered judgment in the amount of $300,000 plus interest.
On April 30, 1990, the court entered an order for Rule
54(b) certification.

R. 487-488.

Defendant/appellee and cross-appellant First Colony filed
its notice of appeal with the court on May 16, 1990, appealing the
order granting plaintiff summary judgment and denying the motion of
First Colony Life Insurance Company for summary judgment.
B.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

In May of 198 6, Roger Fleiss, LaMar Stevenson's insurance
agent employed by Talbert Agency, recommended to LaMar Stevenson
that he obtain a life insurance policy with First Colony Life
Insurance Company.

R. 124, 144-147.

On June 30, 1986, LaMar

Stevenson filled out and signed an application for life insurance
4

with First Colony and on July 7, 1986,

he gave his agent a check

payable to First Colony in the amount of $410 as an initial premium
payment.

R. 124, 149-150.

The check for $410 was forwarded to

United Underwriters, the general agent in the State of Utah for
First Colony Life Insurance Company.

United Underwriters negotiat-

ed the check.
On that same date, July 7, 1986, Norman Close, another
agent

of

issued,

LaMar
on

Stevenson and employee of the Talbert Agency,

behalf

of

First

Colony

Life

Insurance

Company, a

conditional receipt stating that coverage was dependent upon the
insurer's

determination

insurable.

R. 124, 152.

of

whether

or

not

the

applicant

was

A copy of the conditional receipt given

to LaMar Stevenson is attached hereto as Exhibit 2 to the Addendum
of this brief.
At the time the conditional receipt was issued on July 7,
1986, it was standard practice in the life insurance industry that
a conditional receipt not be issued for more than $250,000, a
practice which was followed by First Colony Life Insurance Company.
Affidavit of Leonard Reynolds, R.

349-350.

First Colony Life

Insurance Company intended to issue the conditional receipt for the
amount of $250,000, a sum which is $50,000 less than the $300,000
amount which the conditional receipt specifically establishes as an
amount which cannot be exceeded.
attached exhibit, R. 351-353.

Affidavit of Loretta Stacey and

Upon receipt of LaMar Stevenson's

insurance application, United Underwriters
5

informed the Talbert

office that First Colony would not bind coverage under a conditional receipt for more than $250,000.
Loretta Stacey, R. 353.

Exhibit A to Affidavit of

Talbert, in turn, informed the Stevensons

and it was agreed that the amount of insurance effective under the
conditional receipt was $250,000.

R. 353.

Norman Close testified

that Exhibit A of the Loretta Stacey affidavit was accurate in
stating that Mr. Stevenson agreed to temporary coverage under the
conditional

receipt being limited

to

Norman Close Deposition pp. 93-94, 98.

$250,000.

Transcript of

Copies of these pages are

attached hereto as part of Exhibit 6 of the addendum.
In August of 1986, First Colony Life Insurance Company
notified Talbert Corporation that the life insurance application of
LaMar Stevenson had been rejected and defendants Roger Fleiss and
Talbert Corporation notified the Stevensons that First Colony had
rejected

the

Plaintiff
deposition

life

Maurine

insurance
Stevenson

testimony

that

declined coverage on LaMar.
48,

105 and

106, R.

application.
specifically

R.

154-158, 161.

acknowledged

in

her

she was told that First Colony had
Maurine Stevenson deposition, pp. 46-

154-158; see e^lso Plaintiff's Answers to

Interrogatories at p. 3, R. 161.

Copies of pages 46-48, 105 and

106 of the transcript of the deposition of Maurine Stevenson are
attached hereto as Exhibit 3 of the Addendum.

As of August, 1986,

the Stevensons knew that First Colony Life Insurance Company had
denied LaMar Stevenson's application and that insurance was not in
force.

R. 154-158.

One month later, on October 1, 1986, LaMar
6

Stevenson signed and submitted an application for life insurance
with Banker's Life Insurance Company which specifically disclosed
that he had been declined by First Colony due to the Chapter 11
bankruptcy status of his business.

R. 168.

A copy of the signa-

ture page of this insurance application to Banker's Life Company is
attached to this brief as Exhibit 4 of the Addendum.
On September 29, 1986, United Underwriters, the general
agent

for First Colony, advised Mr. Stevenson's

agents, Roger

Fleiss and Talbert Corporation, that First Colony was closing its
file and would return the premium within ten days.
7; see also R. 284, Entry for 9-29-86.

R. 256, para.

At no time did First Colony

or United Underwriters ever refuse to refund Stevenson's premium
deposit; Maurine Stevenson testified that she knew First Colony had
denied the application, but understood that the premium would be
returned to the agent and used to apply with another company.
342-343.

R.

She was not disturbed by the fact that the premium was

not returned.

R. 343.

See Exhibit 3 of the Addendum, p. 105 and

106.
LaMar Stevenson was killed in an automobile accident on
October 16, 1986, before Banker's Life had finished processing his
insurance application.

R. 125, 170.

Due to oversight on the part

of employees of United Underwriters, the premium deposit of $410
was not returned until after Mr. Stevenson's death, on December 4,
1986.

R. 125, 172-173.

7

First Colony
Stevenson

because

denied

it had

coverage

effectively

for the death of LaMar
terminated

the

temporary

insurance contract in question by rejecting the application and
providing notice of the rejection to the Stevensons over one and
one-half months prior to LaMar Stevenson's accidental death on
October 16, 1986.
RESPONSE TO APPELLANT'S RELEVANT FACTS
The brief of appellant, already on file with this court,
contains a section entitled "Relevant Facts" at pages 4, 5 and 6.
None

of

the

factual

statements

contained

in this

section of

appellant's brief makes an appropriate reference to the record on
appeal, and many of the statements made therein and in other parts
of the brief contradict facts established in the record.
A

copy

of

the

conditional

receipt

issued

to

LaMar

Stevenson is part of the record in this case, R. 152, and is
attached as Exhibit 2 of the Addendum to this brief.

The second

paragraph of that conditional receipt reads as follows:
SECOND. LIMITS PROVISION: MAXIMUM AMOUNT OF INSURANCE
WHICH MAY BECOME EFFECTIVE PRIOR TO POLICY DELIVERY. The
total amount of life insurance and ADB which may become
effective prior to policy delivery cannot exceed
$300,000.
R.

152.

The brief of appellant repeatedly

characterizes this

language of the conditional receipt as "small print" (Brief of
Appellant at 3, 8, 11, 18), "not clear enough to be binding" (Brief
of Appellant at 7) , "neither plain nor conspicuous"

(Brief of

Appellant at 14), "ambiguous" (Brief of Appellant at 15).
8

This

court need only review the conditional receipt to understand that
the limitation language quoted above is clear, plain, conspicuous,
unambiguous, and printed in the same size type as the rest of the
conditional receipt.
Appellant's brief asserts that no one explained the terms
of the [conditional] receipt to Mr. Stevenson, citing from page 45
of the transcript of the deposition of Norman Close.

In fact, the

testimony of Norman Close is simply that he did not talk to LaMar
about

the

conditional

statement

above,

receipt.

upon

As

receipt

of

application, United Underwriters

set forth

LaMar

in the factual

Stevenson's

insurance

informed Stevenson's agents at

Talbert that First Colony would not bind coverage under a conditional receipt for more than $250,000.
of Loretta Stacey, R. 353.

Exhibit A to the Affidavit

The Talbert office, in turn called Mr.

Stevenson, who agreed to drop down to $250,000 which would fall
within the limits of coverage which could be bound by the conditional receipt.

R. 353.

When confronted with this evidence later

in his deposition, Mr. Close confirmed its accuracy.
Deposition transcript pp. 93, 94 and 98.

Norman Close

Copies of these pages are

attached as part of Exhibit 6 to the addendum.
LaMar Stevenson's understanding that coverage would be
limited

to

$250,000 under the conditional

receipt, is further

supported by the fact that the initial complaint in this action
contained a prayer for relieve of $250,000.

In addition, it is

supported by the undisputed evidence that after he was declined by
9

First Colony, LaMar Stevenson made a subsequent application to
Bankers Life for $250,000.

R. 167.

The depositions of Roger Fleiss and Maurine Stevenson
were taken on May 10 and July 26, 1989, respectively; however,
defendants did not have an opportunity to fully discover from Roger
Fleiss

and

Maurine

Stevenson

facts

concerning

the

amount

of

coverage LaMar applied for, because at the time of the depositions,
plaintiff's claim was for $250,000 and the amount of coverage was
not at issue.

On October 2, 1989, plaintiff filed a motion for

leave to amend the complaint to raise the amount of damages prayed
for from $250,000 to $500,000.

The amended complaint was filed

following court approval on November 1, 1989, after commencement of
the summary judgment motions and defendants have not had sufficient
opportunity to discover from witnesses further evidence relating to
the amount of coverage.

Affidavit of Denton Hatch, R. 398-399.

Appellant's brief states that Mrs. Stevenson "was told
that First Colony "intended" to decline coverage . . . .
Appellant at 5.

Brief of

In fact, Mrs. Stevenson's actual testimony did not

use the word "intended", but stated that she was told "that First
Colony had declined coverage on LaMar".
Maurine Stevenson Deposition p. 46.

R. 154, Transcript of

(Emphasis added), see Exhibit

3, p. 46.
Plaintiff's repeated assertions that LaMar Stevenson did
not receive notification of the declination by First Colony are
contradicted by the record.

By the end of August, 198 6, the
10

Stevensons knew that First Colony had declined LaMarfs application.
Maurine Stevenson Deposition at 46.
on

October

1,

1986, LaMar

R, 154-158.

Stevenson

signed

One month later,
and

submitted

an

application for life insurance with Bankers Life Insurance Company
which specifically disclosed that he had been declined by First
Colony due to the Chapter 11 Bankruptcy status of his business.
168.

R.

See copy of the signature page of the Bankers Life applica-

tion attached to this brief as Exhibit 4 of the Addendum.

Clearly,

LaMar Stevenson had no reasonable expectation of coverage at the
time of his death.
Appellant's brief asserts that Mr. Stevenson wanted his
premium returned and asked Fleiss about the premium.

This asser-

tion highlights the disingenuous nature of appellant's claim that
Mr. Stevenson was not aware of the rejection of his insurance
application.
he

still

Certainly he would not expect a return of premium if

anticipated

that

his

insurance

application would be

accepted.
Appellants

assertion

that Mr. Stevenson was

somehow

prejudiced by the retention of the premium is further contradicted
by his wife's testimony in the record.
that

she

knew

Maurine Stevenson testified

First Colony had decxined

the application, but

understood that the premium would be returned to the agent and used
by him ultimately for coverage with another company.

R. 342-343.

She was not disturbed by the fact that the premium as not returned.
R. 343.

See Exhibit 3 of the Addendum, p. 105, 106.
11

The Steven-

sons had no immediate need for a return of premium, because Bankers
Life Insurance Company would not issue a conditional receipt due to
Mr. Stevenson's rejection by First Colony.
would

never

have

accepted

a

premium

In fact, Bankers Life

until

completion

of the

processing of the insurance application, which began two short
weeks prior to his death.

Norman Close, one of the Stevenson's

agents with Talbert in Denver, testified that Bankers Life reguested the application COD, that Bankers Life would not accept a
conditional receipt and therefore no money was needed with the
application.

Norman Close Deposition p. 86.

He further testified

that the return of premium would not have made any difference with
respect to the Stevenson's ability to obtain coverage with Bankers
Life.

Norman Close Deposition p. 87.

Copies of pages 86 and 87 oi

the Norman Close Deposition are attached hereto as part of Exhibit
6 to the Addendum.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Under Utah law, the issuance of a conditional receipt by
a life insurance company after tender of an applicant's initial
premium and policy application creates a contract of temporary or
interim insurance which is subject to the right of the insurer to
terminate the agreement.
of

such

an

agreement

All that is necessary for the termination
is rejection

of the application by the

insurance company and notice of that rejection to the applicant
during his lifetime.

The majority of jurisdictions which have

considered the question are in agreement with this rule of law.
12

Under this rule of law, it is clear that First Colony
Life

Insurance

insurance

Company

contract

with

effectively
LaMar

terminated

Stevenson

when

its

temporary

it rejected

his

application and provided notice of that rejection over one month
prior to his death.

There is no factual issue before this court.

The record clearly establishes that Mr. Stevenson's application was
rejected and that he received notice of that rejection.
The conclusion of the trial court below that a temporary
contract of

insurance cannot be terminated

unless the initial

premium is returned and written notice of rejection of the application is conveyed to the applicant is inconsistent with Utah law.
This court has aligned itself with the view that rejection of the
application and notice thereof are sufficient to cancel a temporary
contract of life insurance.
None of the authorities relied upon by the trial court
has ever concluded that written notice is required and it is clear
that the trial court's conclusion that the notice in this case was
inadequate is erroneous.
Because there existed no valid contract of insurance at
the time of LaMar Stevenson's death, this court need not consider
the question of whether the amount of coverage created by the
conditional receipt was $3 00,000 or $250,000. Alternatively, there
is evidence in the record which clearly suggests that the amount of
coverage created by the conditional receipt was $250,000, and the
trial court erred in concluding that the amount of coverage was
13

$300,000,

particularly

where

the

defendants

were

not

allowed

sufficient time to do discovery on the question after the court
allowed plaintiff to amend the complaint to increase her initial
demand from $250,000 to $500,000.
Appellant

Stevenson's

repeated

assertions

that

the

language of the $300,000 limitation in the conditional receipt is
somehow unclear and ambiguous are contradicted by a reading of the
language itself which clearly informs any applicant or average lay
person

not

trained

in insurance that the amount of temporary

coverage cannot exceed $300,000.

The rule of strict construction

urged by appellant is therefore inapplicable and the handwritten
$500,000 amount in the application does not prevail because no
ambiguity results from considering it together with the language of
the conditional receipt delivered to LaMar Stevenson.
The law does not require that the $300,000 limitation of
the conditional receipt be called to an applicant's attention;
however, even if it did, the evidence indicates that prior to
notice of the rejection of his application LaMar Stevenson was
advised

that

conditional

First

Colony

would

not

bind

coverage under the

receipt for more than $250,000 and agreed to this

limitation.
The Stevensons were not confused or prejudiced in any way
by the delay in returning the premium.

They knew LaMar had been

declined by First Colony long before he applied to Bankers Life
over a month later on October 1, 1986, two weeks before his death.
14

Moreover, the premium was not needed because Bankers Life would not
issue a conditional receipt nor would it accept a premium until
acceptance of the application and issuance of a policy, which never
occurred.
ARGUMENT
I
FIRST COLONY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY EFFECTIVELY
TERMINATED THE TEMPORARY CONTRACT OF LIFE
INSURANCE BY REJECTING THE INSURANCE APPLICATION AND COMMUNICATING NOTICE OF THE REJECTION
TO LAMAR STEVENSON PRIOR TO HIS DEATH.
In Long v. United Benefit Life Insurance Company, Inc. ,
29 Utah 2d 204, 507 P.2d

375 (1973), this court considered at

length the creation and termination of contracts for temporary life
insurance coverage.

There, Mr. Long applied for life insurance,

made the first premium payment and was given a conditional receipt.
Seventeen days later he died in an automobile accident.

Three days

after his death, the insurer, through its local agents, attempted
to give notice to Mr. Long that the application had been rejected
for "confidential reasons" and attempted to return the premium.
Id. at 376.

After considering the legal effect of the conditional

receipt, this

court

adopted

the view

that the

issuance of a

conditional receipt by an insurance company after tender of an
applicant's

initial

premium

and

policy

application

creates

a

"contract of temporary or interim insurance" subject to the right
of the insurer to terminate the agreement.
then ruled that the conditional receipt
15

Id. at 377. This court

created temporary insurance coverage
until such time as the insurers had considered
the application and determined to issue a
policy or reject the risk.
Thereafter, the
insurer cannot terminate the risk so assumed
unless the insured is notified during his
lifetime that his application was rejected.
The facts are undisputed that Mr. Long did not
receive notice of the company's rejection; and,
therefore, the company is liable to the
beneficiary, Mrs. Long.
Id. at 379.

From this court's ruling in Long, it is clear that as

a matter of Utah law, an insurer terminates its obligations under a
temporary life insurance contract by rejection of the application
and notice of the rejection to the applicant during his lifetime.
In the earlier case of Winger v. Gem State Mutual of
Utah, 22 Utah 2d 132, 449 P.2d 982 (1969), this court held that no
contract of insurance existed in favor of the plaintiff where the
insurer made

its determination that he was not

insurable and

elected to decline his application, even though the local agent was
unable to contact the insured to communicate the declination to him
prior to his fatal injury two days later.

Id. at 983.

The majority of other jurisdictions which have considered
this question

are in agreement with this rule of law that a

temporary contract of insurance is terminated by rejection of the
application and notice of the rejection to the insured.

The Ohio

Supreme Court, for example, has held that an "insurer may not be
lawfully required to pay a loss against which it had specifically
refused to insure or be held liable when it had definitely rejected
the application for insurance and thereby refused to accept the
16

risk."

Leube v. Prudential Insurance Co. . 73 N.E.2d 76, 77 (Ohio

1947) , cited in Quindlen v. Prudential Insurance Co. of Am,, 482
F.2d 876, 880 (5th Cir. 1973).

In Leube, the court upheld the

trial

which was

court's

directed

verdict

entered

because the

applicant had received notice of the rejection.
Even the California Supreme Court, in Smith v. Westland
Life Insurance Co., 539 P.2d 433 (Cal. 1975), the case relied upon
by Judge Harding in granting summary judgment to the plaintiff,
conceded that "the most frequently stated rule appears to be that a
temporary contract of insurance is terminated by rejection of the
application and notice thereof to the insured.11

Id. at 439.

Couch

on Insurance likewise states: "The temporary contract is therefore
effective until either superceded by a policy . . .

or terminated

by a rejection of the application, and notice thereof to the
insured."

9 Couch on Insurance § 39:208, at 653 (2d Ed. 1985).
Applying the foregoing legal principle, it is clear that

First

Colony

effectively

terminated

the

temporary

insurance

contract in question by rejection of the application and providing
notice thereof to Stevenson over one and one-half months before his
accidental death on October 16, 1986.
issue are not in dispute.

The material facts in this

By the first of September, 1986, LaMar

Stevenson received notice of the rejection of his application.
Mrs. Stevenson testified that Roger Fleiss called her and told her
that

First

Colony

had

declined

Stevenson Deposition p. 46.

R. 54.
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coverage

on

LaMar.

Maurine

She also testified as follows:

Q: From the point that Roger Fleiss notified
you or United Underwriters, whichever it
was first, you understood that you didn't
have coverage with First Colony Life; is
that correct?
A: Probably.
Maurine Stevenson Deposition, p. 105, R. 157.
Later, on October 1, 1986, LaMar Stevenson signed and
submitted

an application

for life insurance with Banker's Life

Insurance Company on which he specifically acknowledged that he had
been declined by First Colony due to the bankruptcy status of his
business.

See Exhibit 4 of the Addendum, R. 168.

In short, the

undisputed evidence from the record before this court indicates
that in accordance with Utah law as established in Long, supra,
First Colony effectively terminated its interim insurance contract
with LaMar Stevenson by rejection of the application and notice of
that rejection prior to his death.
A.

Utah Law Does Not Require The Return Of An Applicant's Premium Payment As A Condition For The
Termination Of A Temporary Contract Of Insurance.

In her summary judgment motion, plaintiff argued that an
insurer cannot terminate a temporary insurance contract without
returning the premium tendered with the application, relying on
Smith v. Westland Life Insurance Company, 539 P.2d 433 (Cal. 1975),
and Tripp v. Reliable Life Insurance Co. , 499 P. 2d 1155 (Kan.
1972).

The trial court accepted this argument, and in his memoran-

dum decision quoted, verbatim, the holding of Smith v. Westland.
See Exhibit 1 of the Addendum.

The Smith case is representative of
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a line of authority adopted by a small minority of courts, which is
contrary to the majority position adopted by this court in Long,
supra.

In addition, the Smith and Tripp cases are clearly distin-

guishable from this case and are based upon policy considerations
which are inapplicable.
As stated above, the California Supreme Court concedes
that "The most frequently stated rule appears to be that a temporary contract of insurance is terminated by rejection of the
application and notice thereof to the insured."
439.

Smith, 539 P.2d at

This reference in the Smith case is followed by a lengthy

citation of authorities including Service v. Pyramid Life Insurance
Company, 440 P.2d

944

(Kan. 1968), which is quoted

from with

approval by this court in Long v. United Benefit Life Insurance
Co. ,

507 P.2d at 377-379.

Couch on Insurance agrees that "a

temporary contract is therefore effective until either superceded
by a policy . . . or terminated by a rejection of the application,
and notice thereof to the insured."
at 653 (2d Ed. 1985).

9 Couch on Insurance § 39:207,

This rule terminating temporary insurance

coverage simply by rejection of the application and receipt of
notice also squares with the general principle of contract law that
a

party

exercising

the

right to terminate a contract

is not

required to return consideration at the time of communicating the
recision.

12 Williston, Contracts (3rd Ed. 1970) p. 108 et seq.; 5

Corbin, Contracts (1960) p. 607 et seq.
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In addition, both the Smith and Tripp cases are clearly
distinguishable from this case.

As a policy matter, both cases

focused on eliminating the confusion or uncertainty which might be
caused by retention of premiums by the insurance carrier.
Smith,

the

insurance

company

actually

issued

a

policy

modified the coverages from the coverages applied for.

In
which

Mr. Smith

died within twenty-four hours of his last discussion with a company
representative,

who

modifications.

He

tried
had

to
been

persuade
approached

him

to

accept

the

twice

about

the

modifications and probably expected further contact.
In Tripp, the court did not adopt a general rule that
return of premium is always necessary, but specifically confined
its decision to "the facts disclosed in this record . . . ."
P.2d at 1159.

499

Those facts revealed that the conditional receipt

specifically stated that the insurance company would issue a policy
or reject the application within sixty days.

The insured died one

hundred and four (104) days after submission of the application and
it was undisputed

that the insurer failed to comply with the

provisions of its own conditional receipt, as it had taken no
action to either reject the application or notify the insured.
Notwithstanding plaintiff's arguments to the contrary,
First Colony's delay in returning Stevenson's premium did not cause
confusion or uncertainty, which prompted the rulings in the Smith
and Tripp cases.

To say that First Colony did not communicate

unequivocal notification of its decision requires the plaintiff to
20

ignore the record.

As indicated above, the plaintiff admits having

been expressly informed of First Colony's rejection of coverage
during

a

conversation

with

Roger

Fleiss

in

August

of

1986.

Plaintiff admitted she had no reasonable expectation of continued
coverage under the temporary insurance contract.

In such situa-

tions, where "the minds of the parties have met upon the point that
there is an actual cancellation, or expressly understand that the
policy is cancelled, formal tender of the premium is not a condition precedent to cancellation.11

17 Couch on Insurance § 67:240,

at 693 (2d Ed. 1983).
Furthermore, the fact that Stevenson was aware of the
implications of First Colonyfs rejection of his application is
clearly evidenced by his subsequent application for insurance with
Banker's

Life.

Stevenson

acknowledged

on

the

Banker's

Life

Application that First Colony had rejected a previous application
for insurance.
B.

R. 168, Exhibit 4 of the Addendum.
Utah Law Does Not Require Written Notice Of Rejection Of An Insurance Application As A Condition For
Termination Of A Temporary Contract Of Insurance.

The trial court appears to have held that the notice of
rejection of Mr. Stevenson's application was not adequate because
it was not written.
the Addendum.

See Memorandum Decision, R. 296, Exhibit 1 of

This holding appears to be based on an argument from

Tripp v. Reliable Life Insurance Company, supra, that written
notice is required; however, nowhere does the opinion in the Tripp
case make any mention whatsoever of written notice or notification.
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Plaintiff's opposition memorandum to the First Colony
Motion for Summary Judgment, R. 187, attributes the following quote
to the Tripp case:
Similarly, in Tripp v. Reliable Life Insurance
Co, , 210 Kan. 33, 499 P.2d 1155 (1972), the
Supreme Court of Kansas held,
"where application for life insurance
was made, and insurer received the
initial premium and issued a receipt
therefor, a policy of temporary
insurance was created, and said
policy continued in effect until the
insurer declined application, sent
written notification to the insured,
and returned their premium, notwithstanding contrary provisions of
application and receipt." Id. at p.
1159.
Record on Appeal, p. 187.

(Emphasis added by plaintiff).

The

actual language of the opinion in the Tripp case is as follows:
We conclude under the facts disclosed in this
record that when an application for life
insurance is made and the company receives the
initial premium and issues a receipt therefor,
a policy of temporary insurance is created and
said policy of temporary insurance continues in
effect until the insurance company declines the
application, notifies the insured, and returns
the premium, notwithstanding the provisions of
the application and the receipt to the contrary .
499 P.2d at 1159.

(Emphasis added).

Copies of the actual quote

from plaintiff's memorandum and page 1159 from the Tripp opinion
are attached as Exhibit 5 of the addendum.

In the entire text of

the Tripp opinion there is no mention of any requirement of written
notification, and plaintiff's

inclusion

22

and underlining

of the

words "written notification" constitute an egregious misstatement
of the law, which was relied upon by the trial court.
In fact, research has failed to disclose even one case
from any jurisdiction

requiring

insurance carriers to dispatch

written notice in order to terminate temporary insurance contracts.
All that is required is that the insured be " . . . notified during
his lifetime that his application was rejected."
P.2d at 379.

Long, supra, 507

More importantly, a requirement of written notice

does not square with the ruling of this court in Winger v. Gem
State Mutual of Utah, 22 Utah 2d 132, 449 P.2d 982 (1969), where on
facts similar to this case, this court absolved the defendant
insurer of liability even though the applicant never received Gem
State's notification of rejection of the application just prior to
his death.

The Winger case does not concern itself with what form

of notification Gem State pursued, only that the defendant actec
with "reasonable dispatch" in attempting to communicate its action.
Id. at 983.
Based upon the foregoing, it is apparent that Utah cases
and cases from all other jurisdictions follow the rule that "[i]n
the absence of a policy requirement of written notice, any communication of an intent to cancel is sufficient and a writing is not
required."

See 17 Couch on Insurance § 68:140, at 601 (2d Ed.

1983) .
Moreover, the accurate
quoted

above, makes

it

clear

language
that
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the

from the Tripp case,
court's

conclusion

is

confined to the facts disclosed in the record before it, which
established that Reliable Life Insurance sat on its hands for 104
days after receiving the Tripp application and attempted to avoid
coverage after learning of the applicant's death.
this case, there

Id. at 1159.

In

is no question that First Colony acted with

reasonable dispatch in both rejecting the application and communicating its rejection.

Plaintiff acknowledges communications

with Roger Fleiss in August of 1986, little more than a month and
one-half after submitting the application.

Fleiss provided notice

that First Colony had rejected the application due to Stevenson's
bankruptcy.

The plaintiff cannot possibly bear the burden of proof

when she admits that she "probably" knew coverage was terminated
after talking to Mr. Fleiss.
48, 105-106,

Maurine Stevenson Deposition pp. 4 6-

R. 221-224.

No court has ever imposed a requirement of written notice
for the cancellation of a temporary insurance contract, and the
trial court's reliance upon plaintiff's misstatements of the law on
this issue is clearly erroneous.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THERE
WAS NOT ADEQUATE NOTICE OF THE REJECTION OF
PLAINTIFF'S APPLICATION.
In the initial memorandum decision filed by the court
after consideration of the cross-motions for summary judgment, the
court stated:

"The issue before the court is whether written

notice and return of premium are required to terminate a temporary
24

life insurance contract."

R. 296.

Exhibit 1 of Addendum.

holding of the court, however, simply concludes that " . . .
was not adequate notice . . . ."

Id. , R. 296.

The
there

The memorandum

decision is susceptible to two interpretations on this point. The
first and most likely

is that the trial court concluded that

written notification is required and that because First Colony did
not provide written notification prior to Mr. Stevenson's death,
the notice was inadequate.

As argued above, no court in any

reported decision has ever required written notice, and under Utah
law, all that is required is that the insured be notified during
his lifetime that his application was rejected.

Long, supra, 507

P.2d at 379.
The second, less likely, interpretation is that Judge
Harding examined the facts of the record in this case and somehow
concluded

that even under the standard of the Long case, Mr.

Stevenson did not receive notice of the rejection of his application.
To say that the Stevensons did not receive notice of
First Colony's

rejection of the insurance application requires

plaintiff to ignore the record.

Maunne Stevenson testified:

"I

think the next day or two he returned the call, told me that First
Colony had declined coverage on LaMar".

Maurine Stevenson Deposi-

tion p. 46, R. 221, Exhibit 3 of the Addendum.

The Bankerfs Life

application signed by LaMar Stevenson on October 1, 198 6, expressly
responds "yes" to the question "Have you ever had life or health
25

insurance rated, declined, modified or cancelled?"

Below that, the

application states: "First Colony declination due to a business
owned filed Chapter 11 - Reorganization."

R. 229, Exhibit 4 of

Addendum.
There simply is no question of fact on this issue; LaMar
Stevenson received actual notice of the rejection by First Colony
of his life insurance application before his death and any conclusion by the trial court that he did not receive such notice, or
that the notice was somehow inadequate, is clearly erroneous.
Ill
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE
AMOUNT OF THE INSURANCE WAS $300,000, AS THERE
EXISTS AN ISSUE OF FACT CONCERNING THE AMOUNT
OF COVERAGE CREATED BY THE CONDITIONAL RECEIPT.
Because First Colony effectively terminated the temporary
contract of insurance, this court need not consider the questions
raised in the remainder of this brief and in appellant's brief
involving the amount of insurance coverage created by the conditional receipt.

Plaintiff's entire appeal deals with these issues

and is responded to in arguments IV through VI below.
ly,

if this

court ultimately

Alternative-

considers the question, it must

determine whether the trial court correctly found that there was no
genuine issue of material fact as to the amount of insurance, and
in doing

so, must view the

facts and

inferences to be drawn

therefrom in the light most favorable to First Colony Insurance
Company, the party

against whom
26

summary

judgment was granted.

Atlas Corp. v. Clovis National Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 1987).
The trial

court

initially

signed a judgment in the amount of

$500,000, but later limited the amount of the judgment to $300,000
reasoning

that

plaintiff's

judgment

should

be based

conditional receipt rather than the policy applied for.
Decision, R. 407.
consideration

upon the
Memorandum

In so doing, the trial court failed to take into

factual

evidence

suggesting

that

the

amount

of

insurance created by the issuance of the conditional receipt was
limited to $250,000.

The record in this case contains two af-

fidavits, one from Leonard Reynolds, Executive Vice President of
United

Underwriters,

standard

practice

stating

unequivocally,

in the industry

not to

that

"it

is

the

issue a conditional

receipt for more than $250,000, this practice was followed by First
Colony Life."
Stacey

R. 350. Also, Exhibit A to the Affidavit of Loretta

indicates that United Underwriters advised Talbert that

coverage could not be bound for $500,000, and that Mr. Stevenson
agreed with Talbert that the amount of coverage under the conditional receipt was to be $250,000.

R. 351-353.

Plaintiff's original complaint in this action claimed
general damages "in the amount of $250,000", R. 4, and defendants
believe that this was the amount applied for originally by Mr.
Stevenson.

The depositions of Roger Fleiss and Maurine Stevenson

were taken on May 10 and July 26, 1989; however, defendants did not
fully

discover

from

Roger

Fleiss

and Maurine

Stevenson

facts

concerning the amount of coverage LaMar applied for, because at the
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time of the depositions, plaintiff's claim was for $250,000; the
amount was not at issue.

On October 2, 1989, plaintiff filed a

motion for leave to amend the complaint to raise the amount of
damages prayed for from $250,000 to $500,000.

The amended com-

plaint was filed following court approval on November 1, 1989,
after commencement of the summary judgment motions in this action
and defendants have not had a sufficient opportunity to discover
from the witnesses

evidence

concerning

created by the conditional receipt.
R. 398-399.

the amount of coverage

See Affidavit of Denton Hatch

The court denied First Colony's requests for further

discovery on this issue and simply ruled based upon his interpretation of the language of the conditional receipt.

In view of the

recent amendment to the complaint and the factual issues created by
the affidavits of Leonard Reynolds and Loretta Stacey, the trial
court erred in ruling on the amount of coverage without allowing
further time for discovery to resolve factual issues as to the
amount of coverage under the conditional receipt.
IV
THE $300,000 LIMITATION OF THE CONDITIONAL
RECEIPT IS CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS AND THEREFORE
NOT GOVERNED BY THE RULE OF STRICT CONSTRUCTION
ADVOCATED BY APPELLANT.
Appellant's Brief repeatedly characterizes the $3 00,00C
limitation of the conditional receipt as "a limitation in small
print," (Brief of Appellant at 3, 8, and 18) "not clear enough to
be binding,"

(Brief of Appellant at 7 ) , "ambiguous," (Brief of
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Appellant at 7 and 15), and "neither plain nor conspicuous." (Brief
of Appellant at 14) . None of these seven conclusory references is
supported by reference to the actual language of the conditional
receipt given to LaMar Stevenson which plainly and unambiguously
states that "the total amount of life insurance . . . which may
become effective prior to policy delivery cannot exceed $3 00,000."
R. 152.

Exhibit 2 of Addendum.

The entire conditional receipt is

printed on one side of a single page with no "fine or small print,"
and a simple review of the receipt itself by this court will refute
appellant's conclusory assertions.

Appellant completely fails to

articulate with any degree of specificity what it is about the
$300,000 limitation of the conditional receipt that is somehow
unclear or ambiguous.

Appellant urges this court to apply a rule

of strict construction to conclude that the handwritten $500,000
figure in the application for insurance prevails over the $300,000
limitation

of

the

conditional

receipt

and

to

resolve

"ambiguities and uncertainties" in favor of the insured.

alleged
However,

this court has long held that this rule
. . . has no application unless there is some
genuine ambiguity or uncertainty in the
language upon which reasonable minds may differ
as to the meaning.
Auto Lease Company v. Central Mutual Insurance Co., 7 Utah 2d 336,
325 P.2d 264, 266 (1958).

Utah courts, as well as the courts of

other jurisdictions recognize that if the terms of an insurance
contract are clear and unambiguous, those terms are to be interpreted in accordance with their plain and ordinary meaning.
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L.D.S.

Hospital v. Capital Life Insurance Company, 765 P.2d 857, 858-859
(Utah 1988); Valley Bank & Trust v. U.S. Life Title Insurance
Company, 776 P.2d

933, 936

(Utah App. 1989).

The plain and

ordinary meaning of the terms in the conditional receipt before
this court is evident, even for "the average purchaser of insurance
who is not trained in law or in the insurance business."

Wagner v.

Farmers Insurance Exchange, 786 P.2d 763, 765 (Utah App. 1990).
Prior to policy delivery, the amount of coverage cannot exceed
$300,000.
The

cases

cited

by

appellant

invariably

deal

with

ambiguous and uncertain policy provisions and are therefore not
controlling.

Prince v. Western Empire Life Insurance Company, 19

Utah 2d 174, 428 P.2d

163

(1967),

for example is cited as an

example of this court's application of the doctrine of reasonable
expectations.

In Prince it was undisputed that the life insurance

company had not rejected the application prior to Dr. Prince's
death, and the only question before the court involved resolving an
uncertainty as to whether the temporary insurance became effective
upon completion of the initial medical examination or whether a
subsequent medical examination ordered by the company, but not
undertaken prior to the applicant's death, should be determinative.
It should be noted that in the Prince case this court specifically
quoted the $50,000 limitation of the conditional receipt (Id. at
164) and specifically held that Dr. Prince was insured "in an
amount not exceeding $50,000 . . .", precisely the amount not to be
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exceeded under the conditional receipt.

Id. at 169.

Contrary to

the assertion at page 10 of appellant's brief, it is obvious that
this court considered the amount of temporary coverage in Prince
and ruled in accordance with the plain and unambiguous limitation
of the conditional receipt.
Thompson v. Occidental Life Insurance Co. , 513 P.2d 353
(Cal. 1973), is likewise distinguishable.

There, the California

Supreme Court found ambiguity in the statement that the insurer was
not

"required"

to

insure

the

applicant

in excess

of amounts

specified, noting that nothing in the receipt's language prevented
the insurer from voluntarily exceeding the amount specified.
at 364.

Id.

By contrast, the conditional receipt before this court

expressly states that the amount cannot exceed $300,000.

R. 153,

Exhibit 2 of Addendum (Emphasis added).
Appellant cites three cases from the Colorado Court of
Appeals in support of a general rule that an insurer must use clear
and unequivocal language evidencing an intent to limit temporary
coverage and must also call the limiting conditions to the attention of the applicant.

Two of these cases, State Compensation

Insurance Fund v. Wangerin, 736 P.2d 1246 (Colo. App. 1986) and
Leland v. Travelers Indemnity Company, 712 P.2d 1060 (Colo. App.
1985), have nothing to do with temporary life insurance coverage or
conditional receipts, and appellant's reliance upon these authorities is misplaced.
involved

an

State Compensation Insurance Fund v. Wancrerin

existing

workers

compensation
31

policy.

Leland v.

Travelers Indemnity Co, involved the cancellation and reinstatement
of an automobile no-fault policy.

Appellant's assertion that these

two Colorado cases have anything to do with temporary coverage is
simply false.
Sanchez v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Co. , 681
P.2d 974 (Colo. App. 1984) , is also not controlling.

The court's

ruling in Sanchez is confined to the circumstances of the case,
which did not involve any issue as to the amount of temporary
coverage.
risk

and

Mr. Sanchez was notified of his rejection as a standard
requested

consideration

for

non-standard

coverage;

however, the conditional receipt was never delivered to him and he
was not informed of a provision in the conditional receipt terminating temporary coverage if the applicant was rejected as a
standard risk.

Id. at 976-977.

It should also be noted that in

Sanchez, although the insurance application was for $1,000,000 in
coverage, the temporary insurance contract was limited to $300,000,
even though the insured had not received the conditional receipt.
Likewise, the cases of Puritan Life Insurance Co. v.
Guess, 598 P.2d

900

(Ala. 1979), and Keene Corp. v. Insurance

Company of North America, 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert,
den. 455 U.S. 1007 (1982) are not on joint.

Puritan Life, supra,

also involved a conditional receipt which was never delivered to
the applicant, who paid the initial premium, but died prior to a
required medical examination.

Keene v. INA, supra, is an asbestos

declaratory judgment action construing the obligations of insurers
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under comprehensive general liability policies and is yet another
example of appellant's use of string citations containing cases
that do not even remotely relate to temporary coverage under a
conditional receipt.
Appellant's use of these string citations to argue that
courts "often" require that limiting conditions of a conditional
receipt be called to the attention of the insured is inaccurate.
Appellant

cites

only

two

cases, Collister v.

Nationwide

Life

Insurance Company, 388 A.2d 1346 (Pa. 1978), cert, denied, 439 U.S.
1089 (1979) and Young v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. , 77 Cal.
Rptr. 382, 272 Cal. App. 2d 453 (1969), where the court rejected
clear and unambiguous language in a conditional receipt delivered
to the applicant because the requirement of a medical examination
as a prerequisite to temporary coverage was not called to his
attention.

The decisions of these two cases are contrary to the

clear weight of authority of all other jurisdiction, including
Utah.
In Fabrizio v. Fidelity and Guaranty Insurance Co. . 27
Utah 2, 248, 494 P.2d 953 (1972), this court considered the same
unambiguous

limitation

of

a

conditional

receipt

rejected

in

Collister and Young, i.e., the requirement that the applicant first
undergo a medical examination.

In upholding the trial court's

judgment for the defendant insurance company, this court stated:
The language here provides that the insurance
take effect "as of the last of any medical
examinations or tests required under the rules
and practices of the company or the date of
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this payment, whichever shall be the later . .
• •

We have carefully reviewed the record in this
case and we do not discover error which would
require the decision of the trial court to be
reversed.
Id. at 955.

Utah common law follows the contractual rule that it

is not the function of a court to rewrite express and unambiguous
terms in a contract to comport with what might be considered fair
in a particular situation.
(1960).

Utah

common

law

Corbin on Contracts, § 559, p. 268
further

agrees with

authorities on

insurance law that ". . . the court is not authorized to rewrite
the terms of a binder which is clear,"
§ 14:36, at 616 (1959).

1 Couch on Insurance 2d

The $300,000 limitation of the conditional

receipt before this court is simple and unambiguous and therefore
not controlled by the various rules of strict construction which
appellant urges this court to apply.
V
EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD INDICATES THAT PRIOR TO
NOTICE OF THE REJECTION BY FIRST COLONY OF HIS
APPLICATION, MR. STEVENSON AGREED TO LIMIT
TEMPORARY COVERAGE TO $250,000 AND THEREFORE
NEVER HAD ANY EXPECTATION, REASONABLE OTHERWISE, OF TEMPORARY COVERAGE IN EXCESS OF
$250,000.
Even if it is assumed, for prrposes of argument, that the
rule of Collister and Young, supra, applies to this case, there is
evidence in the record (appellants assertions notwithstanding) that
Mr. Stevenson's agents called to his attention the fact that First
Colony would not bind coverage under the conditional receipt for
34

any amount in excess of $250,000.

As set forth in the factual

statement above, the affidavit of Loretta Stacey states that United
Underwriters informed the Talbert office that they could not bind
coverage with First Colony for $500,000 and the Talbert office
called Mr. Stevenson, who agreed to drop down to $250,000, which
would fall within the limits of coverage which could be bound by
the conditional receipt.

Affidavit of Loretta Stacey, R. 353. The

deposition testimony of Norman Close, one of Mr. Stevenson's agents
at Talbert confirms the accuracy of this indication.
Deposition of Norman Close at 93, 94, and 98.

Transcript of

His testimony on

page 98 confirms that "LaMar wanted the reduction of the amount to
$250,000."

See Exhibit 6 to the addendum.

In addition, prior to

the amended complaint, the original prayer for relief in this case
was $250,000.
insurance

If the Stevensons had any reasonable expectation of

coverage

in

excess

of

$250,000, Maurine

Stevenson

certainly would have conveyed that expectation to counsel prior to
the filing of the complaint.

Under these circumstances, even the

rule expressed in Young, supra, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 387, would render
the $300,000 limitation controlling*

See, Young v. Metropolitan

Life Ins. Co.. 98 Cal. Rptr. 77, 20 Cal. App. 3d 777 (1971).
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VI
THE DELAY IN RETURNING THE PREMIUM DID NOT IN
ANY WAY CAUSE UNCERTAINTY OR CONFUSION, NOR DID
IT IN ANY WAY PREJUDICE MR. STEVENSON'S EFFORT
TO OBTAIN OTHER LIFE INSURANCE.
By the end of August of 1986, the Stevensons clearly
understood, as acknowledged by Maurine Stevenson in her deposition
testimony, "that First Colony had declined coverage on LaMar."
Maurine Stevenson deposition p. 46, R. 154.
that

LaMar

didn't

have

coverage

with

Stevenson Deposition, p. 105, R. 157.

They also understood

First

Colony.

Maurine

Over one month later, on

October 1, 1986, LaMar Stevenson finally reached a decision that he
was not going to apply for different coverage with a sister company
to First Colony and signed and submitted an application for life
insurance with Bankers Life Insurance Company, which application
specifically disclosed that he had been declined by First Colony.
R. 168.

As a result of that decision, United Underwriters, the

general agent for First Colony specifically advised Mr. Stevenson's
agents, Roger Fleiss and Talbert Corporation, that First Colony was
closing its file and would return the premium within ten days.
256.

R.

Clearly, under these circumstances, the retention of the

premium for the two week period from October 1 to October 16, when
LaMar Stevenson died, did not lead to the uncertainty and confusion
which confronted the California Supreme Court in Smith v. Westland
Life Insurance Co., 539 P.2d at 442

(1975).

First Colony had

unequivocally given notice of its declination weeks earlier and had
clearly expressed an intention to return the premium.
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Appellant's contention that the retention of the premium
prejudiced Mr. Stevenson and that

M

the delay kept Mr. Stevenson

from obtaining other life insurance" flies in the face of the
record.

Maurine Stevenson, who actually made the premium payment

and dealt first hand with Mr. Stevenson's agents, testified that
she knew First Colony had declined the application, but understood
that the premium would be returned to the agent and used by him
ultimately for coverage with another company.

R. 342-343.

She was

not disturbed by the fact that the premium was not returned.
343.

See Exhibit 3 of the Addendum, pp. 105, 106.

R.

The Stevensons

had no immediate need for a return of the premium because Bankers
Life Insurance Company would not issue a conditional receipt.
fact,

Bankers

Life would never have accepted

In

a premium until

completion of the processing of the insurance application, which
began two short weeks prior to Mr. Stevenson's death.

Norman

Close, Mr. Stevenson's agent with Talbert in Denver, testified that
Bankers Life requested the application COD, that Bankers Life would
not accept a conditional receipt and tnerefore no money was needed
with the application.
the addendum.

Norman Close Deposition p. 86.

He further testified

Exhibit 6 of

that the return of premium

would not have made any difference with respect to the Stevensons'
ability

to

obtain

coverage

with

Bankers

Life.

Norman Close

Deposition p. 87, Exhibit 6 of addendum.
Appellant's

suggestion

that

First

Colony

has

somehow

taken arbitrary action to the disadvantage of Mr. Stevenson is
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simply inaccurate, and the law of Bonneville Properties, Inc. v.
Simmons, 677 P.2d 1113 (Utah 1984) and Resource Management Co. v,
Weston Ranch and Livestock Co. Inc., 706 P.2d 1028, 1037 (Utah
1985) is inapplicable to a situation such as this where inadvertence in failing to return the premium did not result in any
disadvantage to Mr. Stevenson.
CONCLUSION
Under Utah law, the temporary insurance contract created
by the conditional receipt was effectively terminated by First
Colony's rejection of the insurance application and notice of that
rejection to Mr. Stevenson during his lifetime.

It is undisputed

that Mr. Stevenson received notice of the company's rejection and,
therefore, First Colony Life Insurance Company is not liable to his
beneficiary, Mrs. Stevenson.

First Colony Life Insurance Company

respectfully requests that this court reverse the trial court's
entry of summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff and remand the
case to the trial court with directions to enter summary judgment
in favor of defendant First Colony.
Respectfully submitted this 2 ^ d a y of October, 1990.
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C.

Dentin M. Hatch'
Roger R. Fairbanks

38

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was mailed, postage prepaid, this

day of October,

1990, to:
Allen K. Young, Esq,
Douglas A. Baxter, Esq.
YOUNG & KESTER
Attorneys for Plaintiff
101 East 200 South
Springville, UT 84663
D. Gary Christian, Esq.
KIPP & CHRISTIAN
Attorneys for Talbert Corporation and
Roger Fleiss
175 East 400 South, Suite 33C
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

/feW^)fo*A
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EXHIBIT 1

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

^ ^

OF THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY
**********

MAURINE STEVENSON as personal
representative of LAMAR STEVENSON,
and as trustee of LAMAR D. STEVENSON
TRUST,
Plaintiffs,
Case Number
-vs-

CV88-875

RAY M. HARDING, JUDGE

FIRST COLONY LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY, TALBERT CORPORATION
and ROGER FLEISS,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

**********

The Court, having considered the cross motions for
summary judgment in this case, will grant plaintiff's motion,
and will deny defendant First Colony Life's motion.
The issue before the Court is whether written notice
and return of the premium are required to terminate a
temporary life insurance contract. In Smith v. Westland Life
Insurance Co., The California Supreme Court held:
Where the insurer has received an application for
insurance, together with payment of the premium, and
thereafter decides to reject it, the contract of
insurance immediately created upon the receipt of the
application and payment of the premium is not
terminated until (a) the insurer has actually
rejected the application and by appropriate notice
communicated such rejection to the insured, and (b)
refunded the premium payment to the insured. Smith V.
Westland Life Ins. Co., 539 P.2d 433 (1975).
The Court holds that because there was not adequate
notice that plaintiff's temporary insurance contract had been
cancelled, and because the premium was not returned timely,

the contract was in full force and effect at the time of Mr.
Stevenson's death•
Counsel for plaintiff to prepare a summary judgment
consistent with the terms of this decision and submit it to
opposing counsel for approval as to form prior to submission
to the court for signature.
Dated this 2nd day of January^

HARDING, JUDGE--V

cc:

Allen K. Young, Esq.
Denton M. Hatch, Esq.
D. Gary Christian, Esq.
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Tab 2

EXHIBIT 2

(Please detach and give to Proposod Insured)
NOTICE TO PROPOSED INSURED - PART I
In connection with yourapplication for insurance, an investigative consumer report may be prepared whereby information is obtained through personal in
erviews with your family, friends, neighbors, business associates, financial sources, or others with whom you are acquainted This inquiry includes infor
"nation as to your character, general reputation, personal characteristics, and mode of living If an investigative consumer report is prepared in connectioi
with your application, you may receive a copy of that report upon written request to the Company
nformation regarding your insurability will be treated as confidential Hrst Colony Life Insurance Company or its reinsurers may, however, make a brie
eport thereon to the Medical Information Bureau, a non-profit membership organization ol life insurance companies, which operates an informational ex
;hange bureau on behalf of its members If you apply to another Bureau member company tor hie or health insurance coverage, or a damn for benefits u
submitted to such a company, the Bureau, upon request, will supply such company with the information it may have m its We
Jpon receipt of request from you, the Bureau will arrange disclosure of any information it may have in your die NO IT (Medical information will be disclosec
)nly to your attending physician ) If you question the accuracy of information in the Bureau's file, you may contact the Bureau and seek a correction in ac
ordance with the procedures set forth in the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act The address of the Bureau's information office is Post Office Box 105, Esse>
Station, Boston, Massachusetts 02112 Tel (617) 426-3660
"irst Colony Life Insurance Company or its reinsurers may also release information in its file to other life insurance companies to whom you may apply for life
ir health insurance, or to whom a claim for benefits may be submitted

FIRST COLONY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, P.O. Box 1280, Lynchburg, Virginia 24505 Tel (804) 845-0911
CONDITIONAL RECEIPT

No. L

0 9 4 2 2 7 7

This receipt is to be issued if payment is made at the time the application is signed, otherwise, it must not be detached.
The conditions specified in Paragraph "FIRST" must be fulfilled exactly if insurance is to become effective prior to policy delivery. Neither the agen
or the medical examiner is authorized to alter or waive these conditions.
received from (DfO./niXIAJ

^J7^.LPyn^jy>T)

this

.the sum of $__
f
Dr life insura^e to the (Jbmpany This receipt bears the same date and number as the application.

7T"A~

da>

/*>£> in connection with this applicatior

IRST. CONDITIONS PRECEDENT UNDER WHICH INSURANCE MAY BECOME EFFECTIVE PRIOR TO POLICY DELIVERY.
F all the following conditions are fulfilled exactly.
(1) All medical exams, tests, X-rays, and EKG's required by Company rules must be completed
(2) The first modal premium for the amount of insurance which may become effective prior to policy delivery must be received with this applica
tion.
(3) On the datelhat insurance becomes effective under the terms of this receipt, each person to be covered musl be insurable at the class of ns^
applied for, for the plan and amount applied for, without change and at the rate of premium paid.
HEN insurance as provided by the policy applied for and for an amount not exceeding that specified in Paragraph "SECOND" wiii become effect ve on the
itest of.
(1) the date of Part I of this application;
(2) the date of completion of all medical exams, tests, X-rays, and EKG's required by Company rules; and
(3) the Date of Issue, if any, requested in the application
ny alternate or additional insurance applied for will not become effective under this receipt.
ECOND. LIMITS PROVISION MAXIMUM AMOUNT OF INSURANCE WHICH MAY BECOME EFFECTIVE PRIOR TO POLICY DELIVERY
he total amount of life insurance and ADB which may become effective prior to policy delivery cannot exceed $300,000. This amount includes any in
jrance and ADB previously issued or applied for in the Company
HIRD. RETURN OF AMOUNT REMITTED.
he sum paid in exchange for this receipt will be returned upon demand and surrender of this receipt if:
(1) no insurance becomes effective under the terms of this receipt, or
(2) the Company declines this application
his receipt is not valid unless signed by the agent who receives payment THE PREMIUM MUST BE PAID BY CHECK OR MONEY ORDER MADE PAYABLE
D THE COMPANY. DO NOT MAKE CHECK OR MONEY ORDER PAYABLE TO THE AGENT OR LEAVE THE PAYEE BLANK. Any check or money order given in
ayrrent ol this premium must be honored on the first presentation for pavment II you do not hear from the Company legarding the proposed insurance
ithin 60 da\s t notify the Company at its home office in Lynchbuig, Virginia Give the name of the agent, date and amount paid, and the number of this
ceipt

^tiz\\lciJLd^^

this

<^4-7^-y^

QnUJ

t/f^^s

j£_—

Tab 3

EXHIBIT 3

UhKIIHhUUUPY
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
-—000O000

Civil No. CV-88-875

MAURINE STEVENSON as
personal representative of
LAMAR STEVENSON,
Plaintiff,
vs .

Deposition of:

FIRST COLONY LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY, TALBERT CORPORATION
and ROGER FLEISS,

MAUREEN STEVENSON
(Judge Ray Harding)

Defendants.
FIRST COLONY LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Third-Party Plaintiff,
vs .
UNITED UNDERWRITERS AGENCIES,
Third-Party

Defendant.

Deposition of MAUREEN STEVENSON, taken at the
instan e and request of Defendants Talbert Corporation and
Roge Fleiss, at the law offices of Kipp & Christian, City
Centie I, Suite 330, 175 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah,
on the 26th day of July, 1989, at the hour of 10:15 a.m.,
before DENISE M. THOMAS, a Certified Shorthand Reporter, Utah
Licens e No. 129, and Notary Public in and for the State of
Ucah.
oooOooo

Associated Professional Bi3Dorters
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2.

had n o t y e t r e c e i v e d

2
3

Q
you're

t h e p o l i c y and we w e r e

When you c a l l e d
telling

me a b o u t ,

Roger's

office

you i d e n t i f i e d

concerned.,

on t h e

occasion

yourself,

I

4

A

Oh, y e s .

5

Q

Did this man seem to know who you were?

6

A

Yes.

7 J

Q

When you t a l k e d

t o know a b o u t
9 I

A

about

the policy,

presume?

did this

man ^^em

the policy?

He s a i d

he d i d n ' t

know w h a t t h e s t a t u s

i t o u t and g e t back

was, t h a t

he

10

would c h e c k

t o me.

11

Q

Did h e ?

12

A

Yes.

13

Q

How much longer?

14

A

I think the next day or two he returned the call,

15

told me that First Colony had declined coverage on Lamar.

I

16

asked why, because he had cleared everything in the physical

17

aspect.

18

was in a Chapter 11.

He said because we were in a Chapter 11, the company

19

Q

Was it?

20

A

Yes.

21

life

coverage

22

understand

23

okay.

24

issue

And I s a i d ,

that

on L a m a r ? "

And t h e f e l l o w

the mentality

of an i n s u r a n c e

"What d o you m e a n ? "
a policy

25 j p o s i t i o n , "

"What d o e s

when someone

and I s a i d ,

CC

He s a i d ,

He s a i d ,

Exhibit 8

said,

"You h a v e

company,"

and I

"They d o n o t w a n t

i s in t h a t

"Why?"

h a v e t o do w i t h

sort

of

"Because

M£C:IFT

to

financial
of a

to
said
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j

p o s s i b i l i t y of s u i c i d e , " and I s a i d ,

"Well, s o .

2

the p o l i c y

I had no c o m p r e h e n s i o n of

3

what he was t r y i n g

4

been such o c c a s i o n s when s u i c i d e s have been done and looked

5

for r e a l a s an a c c i d e n t , " and so t h e y were j u s t - -

6

Colony had backed off b e c a u s e of t h o s e

7

Q

isn't

in e f f e c t

anyway."

t o t e l l me, and he s a i d ,

With s u i c i d e

" W e l l , t h e r e have

reasons.

Now, when t h i s man, whatever h i s name was, was

8

g i v i n g you t h e i n f o r m a t i o n you have j u s t d e s c r i b e d ,

9

understand

did you

t h a t he was t e l l i n g you s o m e t h i n g t h a t was coming

10

from t h e company or something he was making up and

11

you?

How d i d you t a k e

telling

that?

12

A

I h a d n ' t t h o u g h t of

13

Q

Or d i d you t a k e i t

14

A

No, I r e a l l y d i d n ' t ,

15

First

that.
in any s e n s e ?
j u s t as t h e f a c t s of what was

taking place.

16

Q

Who did you talk to next?

17

A

Roger then called.

18

Q

How long after?

19

A

Just shortly.

20

Q

Okay.

21

A

He again reiterated basically what was said by the

He returned

—

The next day or so forth.

22

fellow in his office and that he didn't see any problem

23

because he could get Lamar right into another company who he

24

didn't see would give this same reasoning or any problem about

25

securing the policy.

COMPUTER!ZED TRANSCRIPT

loo
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1

Q

Did Roger give you any more explanation or talked

2

about the Chapter 11 or suicide that this other fellow was

3

talking about?

4
5

A

I don't recall if we got really into that. I

suppose we did.

6

Q

I don't remember anything specifically.

What sticks in your mind was that Roger confirmed

7

yes, First Colony won't issue the policy and we'll just try to

8

get you somewhere else?

9

A

Yes.

10

Q

Is that what it was?

11

A

Yes.

12

Q

Any more discussion than that?

13

A

He just said that it had been so recent since Lamar

14

had had a physical and all of the other things was in place

15

that all that would be required would be an updated urine

1$

specimen and that he would have a kit sent to us to accomplish

17

that.

18

Q

About when did this conversation take place, Mrs.

19

Stevenson?

20

A

This was at the end of August.

21

Q

Who did you talk to next?

22

A

Roger himself.

23

Q

How much longer?

24

A

Within a week or two weeks.

25

Q

Was that a call you initiated?

COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT

156

105
Q

You may or may not have received it, but you don't

recall it?
A

That's correct.

Q

It was your understanding, I believe you said, that

when you wrote the check, Exhibit 17, you understood that you
had coverage with First Colony?
A

Yeah.

Q

But you u n d e r s t o o d

you s a i d e a r l i e r ,

t h a t t h a t e x i s t e d up t o , I

a c e r t a i n p o i n t t h a t you had d i s c u s s e d ,

think
and

I assume you meant by t h a t s t a t e m e n t when you were n o t i f i e d

by

Roger F l e i s s t h a t F i r s t Colony w o u l d n ' t c o v e r you?
A

Thatfs correct.

Q

From t h e p o i n t t h a t Roger F l e i s s n o t i f i e d

United U n d e r w r i t e r s , whichever i t was f i r s t ,

you or

you u n d e r s t o o d

t h a t you d i d n ' t have c o v e r a g e with F i r s t Colony L i f e ;

is

that

correct?
A

Probably,

Q

When you w r o t e t h e premium and you gave i t t o Roger

or T a l b e r t C o r p o r a t i o n ,

and when they s t a r t e d

a n o t h e r p o l i c y for you,

i t was your u n d e r s t a n d i n g , w a s n ' t

t h a t you would n o t r e c e i v e t h e premium back

t o look

--

A

Yes.

Q

—

A

That's correct.

Q

You knew that First Colony had denied your

the refund back?

for
it,

106
1 I application,

b u t you u n d e r s t o o d

2

returned

3

reapply

4

A

Yes,

5

Q

So t h e f a c t

6

t o Roger
it

in-house

t o a new p o l i c y ;

disturb you; is that
A

That's

8

Q

You j u s t

R o g e r and h i s

10

t h e p r e m i u m would

or h i s company and t h a t

7

9

that

t h e y would

is that

t h a t you d i d n ' t

have

be

reuse

correct?

it

i n hand

didn't

right?

correct.
assumed

that

i t was b e i n g

taken care

of by

company?

A

Yes.

these

t h i n g s were handled

12

Q

Did s o m e o n e t e l l

13

happen,

14

A

No.

15

Q

Did s o m e o n e t e l l y o u when y o u w r o t e o u t t h e $ 4 1 0

11

16

that

check,

it,

I had c o m p l e t e

or d i d you j u s t

Exhibit

trust

No one s p e l l e d

agent

a s an

t h e way i t

agent.

would

that?
it out, no.

1 7 , t h a t c o v e r a g e was i n f o r c e
think

a s an

in h i s e x p e r t i s e

you t h a t ' s

assume

in Roger

at that

anyone s p e c i f i c a l l y

17

A

No, I d o n ' t

18

Q

How a r e you s u p p o r t i n g y o u r s e l f

19

A

I'm living

20

Q

I s t h a t y o u r o n l y s o u r c e of

21

A

Yes.

22

Q

Did you ever talk to Roger Fleiss about whether he

on S o c i a l

said

time?
that.

now?

Security.
income?

23

had authority to issue binding insurance when you gave his

24

company the check, Exhibit 17?

25

A

Did I have any discussions about that?

COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT

No.
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EXHIBIT 4

- D/AiNf\cro Lire t \^£j

N2

^8 LIFE COMPANY DES MOINES. IOWA 50307

JUblZd

INSURANCE APPLICATION
Yes

Do you plan to live or travel (other than vacation) outside of the U.S.?

No_

D

Have you ever had life or health insurance rated, declined, modified j x cancelled?

ID s i

^> Have you ever requested or received benefits because of injury or sickness?
Do you have an application for life or disability income insurance pending in any company, or have you within the
last three months applied for such insurance?
•

D

J)Have you, or do you plan to engage in hang kite gliding, scuba or sky diving, stock, modified, sports car, drag
strip, motorcycle, motor boat, snowmobile or other type of racing?
) Do you plan to fly or have you, within the last five years flown as a pilot, student pilot or crew member?

• BT
j g ^ Q_

Are you or do you intend to become a member of a military^ervice?_
Driver's license number .

ETi

D

0-1

In the last 2 years have you been charged with:

(a) 2 or more motor vehicle moving violations or accidents?

B^D

(b) driving while intoxicated?

•

(c) suspension or revocation of your license?

g

B-T
ETC

• &rf

'Have you in the last five years been arrested for other than traffic violations?
Are you in a regular exercise program (jogging, swimming, etc.)?

B^D i

Any family history of heart or kidney disease, high blood pressure or cancer?
Within the last 5 years have you:
(a) been treated or counselled or joined an organization for alcohol or drug use?

I •

[g-

(b) used amphetamines, barbiturates, sedatives, LSD, marijuana, cocaine, heroin, or morphine, except as j
prescribed by a doctor?

j

i •

EEK~""

"Yes" answers to 33, 34 and 35 require Sports, Aviation, Military Statement respectively. Explain or give reasons
if " Y e s " for questions 29 - 32 and 36 - 40.

^present that ail statements in this application are true and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief. I understand they
5 the basis of any insurance issued. I agree that, except as the Conditional Receipt provides, the Company shall incur no liability
less and until: (1) a policy is issued (2) the policy is received and accepted by the applicant and (3) the first premium is paid. I
ree that these three conditions must occur while, as far as the applicant knows, there has been no change since the^late of this j
m in the health or any other factor affecting the insurability of any person proposed for insurance. I agree that only the Home
fice is authorized to pass on insurability or to make, change or discharge any contract or waive any of the Company's rights. I
ree that the right to change the beneficiary is reserved to the owner unless otherwise provided in question 19. Any change in
;ue age, amount, class, plan or benefits made by the Company shown under "Amendments" is subject to my written ratification.
inderstand the laws of the state listed below shall apply to any policy issued.
This application is COD OR • I have paid S
for • Life • Disability Income insurance. If money paid
lave been given the Conditional Receipt in return. I have read it, and understand and agree to its terms.

Signature of Applicant or Owner (if other than
Proposed insured) If Owner is Corporation,
Officer other than Proposed Insured should sign.

Signature of Proposed Insured
(only if over age 9)

Signature of Parent if
^ P r o p o s e d i n s u r e d j s j j n d e r age 15
gned at
City

JMhL
State

, C ^ - /,. j1%
Date

A\UA^
W\\ne$^2£L

Aaent
Print? 3
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EXHIBIT 5

other, the retention of the premium indicates that the immediate
insurance he was getting for his money is still continuing. This
uncertainty in which the applicant finds himself can be resolved by
conditioning termination on both notice of rejection and refund of
premium. Such a rule will at the same time go far in eliminating risk
of unfairness to the applicant, where the circumstances surrounding
the rejection of his application and notification thereof to him are
disputed. In addition, our decision to adopt this rule is fortified by
the fact that it is unconscionable for an insurance company to hold
premiums without providing coverage." Smith, at p. 442-443.
Similarly, in Tripp v. Reliable Life Insurance Co.. 210 Kan. 33, 499 P.2d 1155
(1972), the Supreme Court of Kansas held,
"where application for life insurance was made, and insurer received
the initial premium and issued a receipt therefor, a policy of
temporary insurance was created, and said policy continued in effect
until the insurer declined application, sent written notification to the
insured, and returned their premium, notwithstanding contrary
provisions of application and receipt." Id. at p. 1159.
In a recent appellate court decision in the ninth circuit, the court held, "Telephonic
notification of an insured that he is not insurable is insufficient to terminate a temporary
insurance contract created by an insurance application." State Farm Mutual Insurance Co.
v. Khoe, 872 F.2d 1427 (9th Cir. 1989; pending petition for re-hearing).
C. Utah courts also require notice to terminate temporary insurance contracts.
Although the above opinions are not Utah cases, Utah courts have considered
similar issues, and have almost universally required notice to the insured of the insurer's
rejection of their application. In Winger v. Gem State Mutual of Utah, 22 Utah 2d 132,
449 P.2d 982 (1969), cited by defendants in their motion, the court emphasizes in its
decision the fact that the insurer acted within a reasonable time in making its determination
that the applicant was not insurable, and in attempting to communicate with the insured its
action in declining his application.

5

TRIPP v. RELIABLE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY

Kan.

H59

Cite as, Kan., 499 P.2d 1155

one year as there were days intervening
between the date of the application and
the approval. In other words, the insured
would be paying for something which
he did not receive. . . . "
(p. 214, 440
R2d 959.)
The defendant distinguishes Service from
the facts in the instant case for the reason
that in Service a regional manager of the
defendant company had the same power as
a general agent and that his statement to
the applicant, that the applicant was covered on receipt of the initial premium, was
binding on the company. We do not have a
general agent in this case. However, the
import of the reasoning in Service, as far
as temporary insurance was concerned, was
not based on the status of the agent who
made the statement binding the coverage.
We recognize that the death of the applicant in the Service case occurred during
the sixty-day period. The insured's child
in the instant case died forty-five days after the sixty days had passed. The reasoning in Service, supporting the theory of
temporary insurance, is consistent with an
extension of the doctrine of temporary insurance until the company acts upon the application.
This is also in accord with the rule of
law established in Waldner and Harvey,
that the company, having received the
premium, had a reasonable time and no
more than a reasonable time in which to
act. It should be pointed out that in the
application made by the plaintiff for insurance it was provided that the company
would have sixty days from the date of
the receipt of the application to determine
the insurability of the applicant, and the
application further provided that sixty days
was deemed to be a reasonable period. In
view of this it would logically follow that
the insurance company should have returned the premium at the end of the sixty-day
period since they had agreed in writing that
this was the extent of the time they needed to determine the insurability of the ap-

plicant. Any delay in returning the premium thereafter falls directly under the rule
established in Waldner and Han'ey.
[4] The only reason for failure to return the premium at the end of the sixty
days would be that the company was still
contemplating issuing the policy. We cannot support a rule which would permit an
insurance company to make a decision on an
application after the insured's death. We
conclude under the facts disclosed in this
record that when an application for life
insurance is made and the company receives
the initial premium and issues a receipt
therefor, a policy of temporary insurance
is created and said policy of temporary insurance continues in effect until the insurance company declines the application, notifies the insured, and returns the premium,
notwithstanding the provisions of the appli-/
cation and the receipt to the contrary.
The defendant argues that attorney fees
should not be allowed in this case for the
reason that the defendant had in good faith
a reasonable basis for refusing to pay the
plaintiff's claim. We have stated in many
instances that the allowance of attorney
fees depends upon the facts and circumstances of each particular case and only
when the insurer refuses without just cause
or excuse to pay in accordance with the
terms of the policy can an allowance be
made to the insured for reasonable
attorney fees. (Parker v. Continental Casualty Co., 191 Kan. 674, 383 P.2d 937.)
[5] In view of the necessity of construing the language of the application and
the receipt for the first time as applied to
the facts disclosed by this record we feel
the defendant had just cause and excuse to
refuse payment; therefore, no attorney fees
should be allowed. Costs are assessed
against the defendant.
The judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part.
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IN THE JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

3[
'Civil No. CV-88-875

4

'
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5 |DEPOSITION OF:

NORMAN CLOSE, January 23, 1990

6
MAURINE STEVENSON, as personal representative of
7 I LAMAR STEVENSON,
8

Plaintiff,

10 I FIRST COLONY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, TALBERT CORPORATION and
iROGER FLEISS,
11
Defendants.
12
13

FIRST COLONY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,

14

Third-Party Plaintiff,

15

v.

16

UNITED UNDERWRITERS AGENCIES,

17

Third-Party Defendant.

18
19 |
PURSUANT TO NOTICE, the deposition of NORMAN CLOSE was
taken on behalf of the Defendants and Third-Party Plaintiff at
20 |1120 Lincoln Street, Suite 1100, Denver, Colorado 80203, on
January 23, 1990 at 2 p.m., before Jill L. Webster, Registered
21 |Professional Reporter and Notary Public within Colorado,
22
23
24
25

r-. Yr
/ 7

V

-Ali 332-9525 * 1300 Grant St.. Suite 420. Denver. CO 502C3, (303) 322-5965 • 1-300-525-3420

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

1

_^

contract. Th at would be my supposition.
You have to understand, I don't have a lot of

2
3

control over that money.

4

the cases, in my experience, the money went to the insured. And

5

I have a very difficult time trying to find out when the money

6

was received.

7

Q-

Like I said before, in the majority of

If that was her plan—that is, that she would not

8

receive it ba ck, but the agent would reapply it—if that was her

9

plan, you were entirely unaware of it; is that correct?

10

A.

That's correct.

11

Q.

Did you need it for your re-application to Bankers

13

A.

Bankers Life requested the application COD.

14

Q.

What does that mean?

15

A.

They would underwrite the case, look at the

12

Life?

16

underwriting material, look at the exam from First Colony before

17

they would ma ke a decision.

18

Q.

They would not accept a conditional receipt?

19

A.

That's correct.

20

Q.

Did you not need the money to apply to Bankers

22

A.

No.

23

Q.

So was there any advantage lost by not having the

21

24
25

Life?

premium that you know of?
A.

Advantage to Maurine?

87
1
2

Q.

To the Stevensons.

Were they prejudiced in any

way by not having the premium?

3

A.

You'll have to explain that one to me.

4

Q.

As far as being able to obtain other insurance.

5

A.

Would having the money made the insurance go in

6

force with Bankers Life?

7

Q.

Yes.

8

A.

The answer is no.

9

Q.

So having the money would not have made any

10

difference with respect to their ability to obtain coverage?

11

A.

12

conditional receipt.

13

Q.

14

They're only accepting the application, not a

So the answer to that question is it would not

have made a difference?

15

A.

No.

16

Q.

If First Colony said they would return the premium

Yesf it would not have made any difference.

17

within ten days on September 29, and it was not returned by

18

October 18, do you have an opinion as to whether or not that

19

would be an unreasonable length of time?

20

MR. BAXTER:

21

A.

23
24
25

How do I respond to that?
MR. BAXTER:

22

Object to the form of the question.

That just goes on the record.

You

can answer his question, if you can.
Q.

(BY MR. HATCH)

This is a yes or no question.

Do

you have an opinion as to whether 19 days, basically what Ifm

93
1

Q.

Have you seen that before?

2

A.

No, I haven't.

3

Q.

Does that refresh your recollection about'—

4

A.

$250,000, yes.

5

Q.

It does?

6

A.

Yes.

7

Q.

What do you recall?

8

A.

I had forgotten when and how we arrived at that,

9

Q.

Is this memo accurate, to the best of your

10

recollection?

11

A.

Yeah, I guess.

12

Q.

Okay.

13

A.

I have three questions.

14

Q.

Sure.

15

A.

In the middle of the memo it says, "There's no

16

covering letter."

17

describes what that means?

18

Q.

I think so.

May I?

Is there anything that has come out that
I have no idea what that means.

Not to my knowledge.

It says, "July 13, a

19

conditional receipt signed by Norm Close was mailed to

20

Stevensons.

21

have a cover letter in the file and—not that I know of.

There was no covering letter."

22
23
24
25

I guess we don't

MR. CHRISTIAN:

What's Mr. Close supposed to do

(BY MR. HATCH)

Go ahead and ask your questions

with this now?
Q.

and I'll ask you a question.

94
A.

I would probably disagree with the one statement

that says, "Final notice of declination was advised by United
Underwriters," because my understanding, as per our
notice—Chris's chronology was the file was closed, and I
believe that the declination was in August.

And so my

understanding would conflict with this, as far as this final
notice of declination, because in my opinion and in Roger's
understanding, we were done in August.
Q.

(BY MR. HATCH)

With respect to the $250,000, is

A.

I guess it surprises me. And I didn't have

that—

anything down in my file about when we decided to do it and how
it was done, and it's just missing from my recollection of it
entirely when and how and what the process was.
Q.

Well, let's be clear.

Now, can you say whether or

not that is accurate?
A.

I believe it to be accurate.

Q.

Look at the next one. When I say that and when

you say you believe it to be accurate, we're talking about the
$250,000 question, right?
A.

Yes. What it indicates to me is that we didn't

make that adjustment, or the adjustment was requested while the
policy was in underwriting.

Which would mean that if the policy

was issued, it would have come out with an amendment, which is
First Colony's standard procedure to say we've reduced the face

98
1

Ifm getting confused with that letter, but I thought there was

2

one, too.

3

Q.

(BY MR. HATCH)

Just to be clear, ba ck on 38, if I

4

was your understanding the reduction—Lamar wanted the reduction

5

of the amount to $250f000?

6

A.

Yes.

7

Q.

Did you have an understanding of where the premium

8 was located?
9

A.

Supposition.

10

Q.

Based on your experience with United Underwriters,

11

you didn't kn owf is that what you're telling me?
A.

12

I can give you my best opinion of where I thought

13

it was; that1 s at First Colony.

14

California wh ere the underwriting is, because the check was made

15

out to First Colony.

16

Q.

17

Either Lynchburg or in

You did not bring any documents with you today

purs>uant to the subpoena; is that correct?
A.

18

No.

Everything that I know that exi sts is

19

represented h ere, or was duplicated from the files that I had at

20

Talbert Corporation.
MR. HATCH:

21
22

You didn't have any new ones?

23
24 [file.
25

Gary's already produced those to me.

MR. CHRISTIAN:

I understand I have the whole

I havenft checked.
MR. GILL:

As far as I know, that's right,

